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COMMENTS
CHANGING STANDARDS OF OBSCENITY IN TEXAS
by Dan Rosen
Texas obscenity laws traditionally have changed as the United States
Supreme Court's standards for judging obscenity have changed.' The
most recent modification of the Texas laws took effect September 1, 1979. 2
The 1979 revisions, closely tracking the Supreme Court's language in
Miller v. Caifornia, 3 establish new definitions of obscenity4 and expand
the prohibitions against its distribution.- Punishment for the use of chil-
dren in pornography has been strengthened.6 The 1979 statutes, however,
still fail to encourage consistency in obscenity prosecutions. Because juries
in each community are allowed to set the standards for obscenity, 7 pub-
lishers are denied notice of what they may promulgate legally and argua-
bly are deprived of due process of law.8 This Comment charts the
changing standards of obscenity in Texas, analyzes the current statutes,
i. The evolution of Supreme Court obscenity standards began with Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), continued through A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and reached its current state
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 30-55
infra and accompanying text.
2. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21, .23, .25 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
3. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a discussion of Miller, see notes 42-55 infra and accompa-
nying text.
4. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
5. See id § 43.23.
6. See id § 43.25.
7. 413 U.S. at 26. The Miller Court rejected a national standard for obscenity, stating
that the nation is too large and diverse for such a test. Id at 30.
8. Due process requires that the law put a person of reasonable intelligence on notice
as to what is prohibited. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (regulation of
charities inadequately defined terms and conditions for compliance); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (language of wage regulation required persons of common
intelligence to guess at its meaning); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]. To the extent that com-
munity standards differ as to obscenity, publishers lack the information necessary to deter-
mine whether their material is legal in a given locale. Thus, vagueness is the vice. Because
the Miller test allows juries to determine what the community finds acceptable, statutes may
be -interpreted in various and conflicting ways. Because regulation of speech and press re-
quires special safeguards, the community standards approach falls short of what arguably is
a minimum level of protection. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (statute criminal-
izing contemptuous treatment of the United States flag held void for vagueness); Papachris-
tou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance drafted in archaic
English held void for vagueness); Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued
Judicial Vagueness- An Argumentfor Abandoning Obscenity as a Legal Concept, 21 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 181 (1973); Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960).
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and concludes that the Texas law fails to promote predictability in obscen-
ity regulation.
I. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
Defining obscenity has proved difficult." Justice Harlan has called the
situation "intractable,"'10 and Justice Stewart once resorted to an "I know
it when I see it" test. I I Nevertheless, courts and legislatures continually
have tried to reach a consensus on a formula that offers uniformity and
predictability. Their efforts have been frustrated by the fact that concepts
of obscenity have changed on three levels: time, space, and depth.
Whatever was thought to be obscene in one year has not been considered
necessarily obscene in the next; whatever was thought to be obscene in one
state has not been considered necessarily obscene in another; and whatever
was thought to be obscene by one person has been perfectly acceptable to
another. 12 The constant evolution has prevented any definition from be-
coming anything more than a connotation. Thus, the word "obscenity"
merely conjures up individual notions of what is intolerable, much like
Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" crucible. The current constitu-
tional standard for obscenity, as fixed in Miller,13 simply masks this sub-
jective test in the guise of an objective "community standards" test.
A. Early Developments
Nineteenth century obscenity laws changed frequently as the legal com-
munity attempted to respond to the mores of the community as a whole.14
In the early part of the century obscenity regulation was quite limited.' 5
The first recorded American case dealing with obscenity was decided in
1815 when a Pennsylvania court convicted a defendant of filthy conduct
9. See generally M. ERNST & A. LINDLEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON (1940); M.
ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE (1964); F. LEWIS,
LITERATURE, OBSCENITY, AND LAW (1976).
10. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
1I. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn, now a schoolchild's staple, once was censored for
its purported adverse effect on juveniles. See E. DE GRAZIA, CENSORSHIP LANDMARKS 154
(1969); Tobolowsky, Obscenity: 4 Continuing Dilemma, 24 Sw. L.J. 827, 828 (1970). Hustler
magazine, tolerated in most states, has been declared obscene in Georgia. See Flynt v.
State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669 (1980). Furthermore, the market for so-called adult
material demonstrates that it is not considered offensive by a significant minority in many
communities. One estimate is that sexually explicit material grosses $41.7 million in Texas
annually. The state is said to have 292 establishments selling such material. See HousE
SELECT COMM. ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: ITS RELATED CAUSES AND CONTROL, 66TH
LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS, INTERIM REPORT 66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
13. 413 U.S. at 24.
14. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 656-58 (1978); Tobolowsky, supra
note 12, at 827-28.
15. See Tobolowsky, supra note 12, at 827. Massachusetts was the only state that had
an obscenity statute at the time of the American Revolution. The law prohibited anything
"wicked, profane, impure, filthy and obscene." L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 657-58 (quoting
Ancient Charter, Colony Laws and Province Laws of Massachusetts Bay (1814)).
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for displaying a lewd picture.' 6 Congress did not impose sanctions until
1842 and then only for the importation of obscene pictures. 17 In 1873,
however, Congress passed what came to be known as the Comstock law,
banning possession of any "obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, adver-
tisement, circular, print, picture, drawing . . . or other article of an im-
moral nature," and barring such material from the United States mail.' 8
To determine what was obscene, the courts applied the standard of Regina
v. Hicklin,' 9 a test formulated by the Queen's Bench based on the mate-
rial's tendency to deprave those persons already receptive to immoral in-
fluences and into whose hands the material might fall.20 Under the
Hicklin approach, isolated passages were used to determine the effect on
the most susceptible persons. 2' The test also was used by state courts,
which applied it strictly to ban books otherwise considered to be important
literature.22
Opponents of the Hick/in rule and the Comstock law took solace in the
1913 district court decision in United States v. Kennerley.23 Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in Kennerley marked the beginning of a judicial retreat
from the strict standards of the previous century. Concerned about the
homogenization of ideas that results from an inflexible definition of ob-
scenity, Judge Hand found that the old standards did not comport with
modern notions of obscenity. 24 Although criticizing the Hicklin rule, he
16. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawl. 91 (Pa. 1815).
17. See Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566 (repealed 1933). The law was
aimed at controlling the French postcard trade. At the time, Congress did not consider
words proper for obscenity regulation. See Tobolowsky, supra note 12, at 827-28.
18. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, §§ 1-3, 17 Stat. 598 (repealed 1933). See also Act of
July 12, 1876, ch. 186, §§ 1-2, 19 Stat. 90 (repealed 1940). The Act is referred to as the
Comstock law because of the lobbying efforts of Anthony Comstock, the leader of the New
York Society for the Suppression of Vice.
19. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). In Hicklin a pamphlet criticizing the Roman Catholic
Church was held to be obscene.
20. Id at 369. American cases applying the Hicklin rule include United States v.
Clarke, 38 F. 500 (E.D. Mo. 1889) (overruling demurrer to indictment for mailing "Dr.
Clarke's Treatise on Venereal, Sexual, Nervous, and Special Diseases"), and United States
v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (affirming conviction for mailing "Cupid's
Yokes, or The Binding Forces of Conjugal Life").
21. The Hicklin rule banned a whole work based on any section found to be obscene,
no matter how short or inconsequential.
22. Among the works of literature declared obscene were Lady Chatter/y's Lover by
D.H. Lawrence in Commonwealth v. Delacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930), and An
American Tragedy by Theodore Dreiser in Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171
N.E. 472 (1930). The Supreme Court's decision in Roth v. United Slates ended the efficacy
of the Hicklin rule. See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
23. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). The court in Kennerley overruled a demurrer to the
indictment of the publisher of Hagar Revely, a book chronicling a young woman's life in
New York.
24. Id at 120. Judge Hand wrote:
[I]t seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in
letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to
the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or
that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the




nevertheless applied it as the law of the land. 25
Judge Hand's concern in Kennerley was echoed twenty-one years later
in United States v. One Book Entitled U/ysses,26 wherein the Second Cir-
cuit rejected the "most susceptible persons" and "isolated passages" ap-
proach of the Hicklin rule. Instead, the court decided that a book or
presentation would be protected if it was "sincere, and the erotic matter
[was] not introduced to promote lust and [did] not furnish the dominant
note of the publication. ' 27 The fact that the book might promote salacious
thoughts in some people was irrelevant.28 The U/ysses decision thus set
the stage for the use of community standards and foreshadowed Supreme
Court decisions judging a work as a whole rather than by its most provoca-
tive part. 29
In 1957 the Supreme Court finally announced a constitutional standard
for obscenity in Roth v. United States.30 Affirming a federal conviction for
mailing obscene material, 3 ' the Court first removed obscenity from the
realm of the first amendment, stating that it was not protected by the con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press. 32 The Court held,
however, that descriptions or depictions of sex in art, literature, and sci-
ence were entitled to first amendment protection. 33 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing the majority opinion, then prescribed the proper test: To be obscene
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person, applying contemporary community
25. Id Judge Hand anticipated the modern approach of judging obscenity on the basis
of contemporary community standards, stating, "[t]o put thought in leash to the average
conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and
least capable seems a fatal policy." Id
26. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
27. Id. at 707.
28. Id. In contrast, the Hicklin rule had judged a work on the effect of isolated passages
on the most susceptible members of society.
29. See notes 30-55 infra and accompanying text. The Ulysses test, however, remained
subject to varying subjective interpretations as the concepts of sincerity and intent were diffi-
cult to reduce to precise standards. See Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir.
1945); United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Levine,
83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
30. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court previously had ruled on obscenity convictions with-
out considering the constitutionality of the statutes involved. See United States v. Lime-
house, 285 U.S. 424 (1932); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
31. 354 U.S. at 493. The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948)
(amended 1971), which punished the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy" materi-
als. In a companion case, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court affirmed a
similar conviction under a California statute. Id. at 493-94.'
32. The Court found that obscenity was not speech within the meaning of the first
amendment, concluding that it serves "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and...
that any benefit that may be derived. . . is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-
72,(1942)). Thus, the Court concluded that obscenity was utterly without redeeming social
value. 354 U.S. at 484-85; see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of
Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962); Gerber, A
Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 834 (1964); Miller, Obscen-
ity and the Law of Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 575 (1963).
33. 354 U.S. at 487.
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standards. 34 The Court expressly abandoned the Hicklin and Comstock
tests, stating that the effect of isolated sections of material on the most
susceptible persons was an improper benchmark.
35
Despite its status as the constitutional test for obscenity, the Roth
formula failed to create consistency, 36 and nine years later even the
Supreme Court divided when it decided the constitutionality of a book
titled John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.37 The Court held
that Memoirs was not obscene, 38 but a majority could not agree on a rea-
son.39 The plurality opinion refined the Roth test, adding the requirement
that to be obscene the material must be "utterly without redeeming social
value."'40 Additionally, to be obscene the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole had to appeal to a prurient interest in sex, and the mate-
rial had to be patently offensive in that it affronted contemporary commu-
nity standards as to the description or depiction of sexual matters.4'
34. Id. at 489.
35. Id
36. See Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REV.
185 (1969); Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and Fall ofRoth-A Critique of the Recent Supreme
Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L.J. 731 (1974); Annot., 41 L. Ed. 2d 1257 (1975). Malone
v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 231, 339 S.W.2d 666 (1960), displayed the confusion in the courts.
In Malone the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed an obscenity conviction because
the trial court did not inform the jury of the Roth standard. See 6 S. TEX. L.J. 57 (1961).
37. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The plurality, Justice Brennan writing and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justice Fortas, overturned a conviction involving the novel popularly
known as Fanny Hill. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred. Justices Clark,
Harlan, and White dissented. The book also had been the subject of an obscenity trial in the
same state more than 100 years earlier. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821),
in which the supreme judicial court convicted the book's publisher of obscenity. Excerpts
from Memoirs may be found in A. GERBER, SEX, PORNOGRAPHY, AND JUSTICE (1965).
38. 383 U.S. at 419. Oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Memoirs and other
landmark cases are transcribed in OBSCENITY (L. Friedman ed. 1970).
39. Justice Stewart concurred in reversing the conviction because in his opinion the
book was not hard-core pornography. 383 U.S. at 421. See also Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Black concurred in Memoirs be-
cause he believed the Court did not have the power to censor any speech or press. 383 U.S.
at 421. See also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 481 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas concurred on similar grounds, stating that the Constitution confers no power on the
government to control the expression of ideas. 383 U.S. at 431. Justice Douglas's position
conflicted with the Court's underlying theory in Roth that obscenity was something other
than the expression of an idea.
40. 383 U.S. at 418. Memoirs presented prosecutors with an almost impossible burden.
Not only were they required to prove a negative, utterly without redeeming social value, but
they also were required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973). The dissenters in Memoirs anticipated the burdens that
the "utterly without redeeming social value" test would place on prosecutors. Justice Harlan
wondered if the phrase had any meaning at all. 383 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. 383 U.S. at 418. Justice Brennan abandoned his Memoirs formula in a dissenting
opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (decided at the same time
as Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)), concluding that the "utterly without redeeming
social value" test was unworkable. 413 U.S. at 79. The Court's frustration with the test was
evident in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972), in which it stated that "[a] quotation
from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene
publication." For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of American obscenity law
through Memoirs, see Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and
12051981]
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B. The Miller Test
The Memoirs test persisted until 1973 when in Miller v. California4 2 the
Court returned to a test similar to that in Roth. Limiting obscenity to spe-
cifically defined "hard core" sexual material,43 the five-Justice majority
reemphasized that obscene material is not protected by the first amend-
ment, 44 but stated that the Constitution requires potential defendants to be
put on notice by specific definitions of proscribed material. 45 According to
the Miller Court, obscenity regulation is limited to patently offensive
works that taken as a whole depict or describe sexual conduct in a manner
that lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,' 46 a stan-
dard much less protective than that espoused by the Memoirs plurality.
Moreover, the Miller test requires the trier of fact to find that because of
the work's patent offensiveness "the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards," would find it appealing to his prurient inter-
est.47 The Miller Court also explained the meaning of the7 phrase
"community standards. ' ' 48 More precisely, the Court explained what that
phrase does not mean, stating that "contemporary community standards"
does not mean a national standard. 49 The first amendment does not re-
quire that the people of Mississippi accept conduct that is tolerable in Las
Vegas.50 Rather, triers of fact are to consider the standards of their com-
munity..'
The Miller decision prompted the Texas Legislature to revise its obscen-
Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966); Comment, Obscenity Standards in Current
Perspective, 21 Sw. L.J. 285 (1967).
42. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
43. Id at 27-28. Although the Court used the phrase "hard core" in quotes, it never
really defined the term. An inference may be made from the opinion that the state laws
cited by the Court, see HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 1210-1216 (1972) (current version at HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 712-1210 to - 1216 (1975)), OR. REV. STAT. §§ 255-262 (1971) (current version
at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060-.095 (1979)), provide examples of constitutional legislation
that represent such "hard core" activities. The Court made clear that the states are not
limited to these examples. 413 U.S. at 25. Accordingly, the parameters of hard-core sexual
material are imprecise and perhaps illusory.
44. 413 U.S. at 34-37. The Court limited first amendment protection to "serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, [and] scientific" works taken as a whole. Id. at 34. See also Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942).
45. 413 U.S. at 27.
46. Id at 24.
47. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). The Court thus has
evolved from its position in Roth that obscenity is unprotected because it is utterly worthless,
through its Memoirs approach by which obscenity was unprotected only if utterly worthless,
to its conclusion in Miller that obscenity may be unprotected even if it is not utterly worth-
less. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 661-62.
48. 413 U.S. at 30-31.
49. Id In Miller the State of California, the state of the forum, was considered an
appropriate community. Id at 33-34.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id at 33-34. In his dissent Justice Douglas expressed concern about the effect that
the "community standards" approach would have on a defendant's first amendment rights
because, under Miller, publishers are subject to at least 50 different standards. Id. at 44.
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ity statutes to conform to the new standards.5 2 Despite the Miller Court's
declaration that it was not trying to propose specific regulatory schemes for
the states,53 the Texas Legislature incorporated the Court's examples of
obscenity almost verbatim. 54
The Miller approach adopted by Texas, however, poses difficulties. As a
result of the "community standards" focus, the effect of the Court's re-
quirement that states provide specific definitions of proscribed material is
undermined. The statutory definitions give defendants little notice, as the
definitions are filtered through jurors' perceptions of what the community
finds patently offensive. Because different communities have different
standards, publishers can ascertain those standards only by distributing
their material and being tried for obscenity. Even juries in the same city,
one in state court and the other in federal court, could reach different re-
sults on the same material at the same time.55 Accordingly, while the
Miller formula may be more tolerant than the early nineteenth century
tests for obscenity, it results in little or no progress toward uniformity.
II. CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF OBSCENITY IN TEXAS
Since its days as an independent republic, Texas has recognized the right
of free speech.5 6 Despite the constitutional language, though, that "[n]o
law shall ever be passed to curtail the liberty of speech or of the press," 57
the state traditionally has curtailed speech and printed material deemed
obscene.58 Early laws were concerned primarily with the effect of obscen-
ity on children. The Penal Code of 1857, for example, defined obscene
material as that which was "manifestly designed to corrupt the morals of
youth." 59 Early cases also reflected that concern. In State v. Hanson60 the
52. See notes 2-6 supra and notes 115-17 infra and accompanying text.
53. 413 U.S. at 25. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the United States
Supreme Court reiterated that the examples in Miller were not intended to be the only activ-
ities the state could regulate. Id at 114.
54. The Court in Miller gave the following examples of what a state could define as
obscene: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, nor-
mal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21(a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), include the
Court's examples plus other provisions added by the legislature. See notes 118-46 infra and
accompanying text.
One commentator suggested that the presence of "excretory functions" in the list implies
that the true basis of obscenity regulation is not fear of the effect of obscenity but rather
offensiveness. See A. GERBER, supra note 37, at 213-14. The inclusion of "excretory func-
tions" is a curious anomaly given the fact that the Court claims to restrict obscenity regula-
tion to sexual conduct.
55. See Comment, "Contemporary Community Standard" in Obscenity Prosecutions-
Smith v. United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (1978).
56. "Every citizen shall be at liberty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. No law shall ever be passed to
curtail the liberty of speech or of the press . REPUBLIC OF TEX. CONST., DECLARA-
TION OF RIGHTS-FOURTH (1836).
57. Id TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 has similar language.
58. See Tex. Penal Code art. 365 (1895); id. art. 343 (1879); id. art. 399 (1857).
59. Id. art. 399 (1857).
60. 23 Tex. 233 (185 9 ).
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defendant had been indicted for publishing an allegedly indecent and ob-
scene newspaper called John Donkey. The paper purportedly had been
manifestly designed to corrupt the morals of the youth of Galveston
County. 61 The indictment, however, did not reveal the contents of the
newspaper, perhaps in deference to the sensitivities of those who might
have read the official document. Ruling that the omission rendered the
indictment insufficient, the court held that a description of the obscenity
was necessary so that the court could assess its character. 62
The holding in Smith v. State63 affirmed the right of the judge to deter-
mine whether written material was obscene.64 In Smith the defendants
were indicted for carving "Ass-Hole Work" into the back of a church
bench while the rest of the congregation was kneeling at prayer.65 The
court first noted that the indictment contained the actual words alleged to
be obscene, thus avoiding the insufficiency problem of Hanson. The court
then found the material to be obscene, but held that the jury also had to
find that it was designed to corrupt the morals of youth. 66 According to
the court, that element of the offense referred to the intent of the defend-
ants67 without regard to whether the statement produced a corrupting re-
sult.68 Rather, the jury had to discern what was in the mind of the
accused. After Hanson and Smith the standard for obscenity consisted of
two elements: objectionable words and corrupting intent. Both were nec-
essary; neither one alone was sufficient. In Edwards v. State 69 only the
intent to corrupt appeared to be present. The defendant had been indicted
for passing a note which read, "Stay with me after school. I have secured a
powder through the mail that will make you safe."' 70 Despite the finding
of intent, the court ruled that the message was not the type that the law
sought to punish.7 1 Similarly, in Hudnall v. State 72 the court refused to
convict a defendant who had driven a car on which was drawn a rooster
followed by the word "wagon."'73 The indictment alleged that the car con-
veyed "the information and impression that [it] was a cock wagon."'74 Ad-
ding to the innuendo, the back of the car bore the legend, "chase me,
chickens, front full of corn."'75 The court, however, found nothing offen-
sive about the picture and words. Searching the dictionary in vain for an
61. id.
62. Id. at 234.
63. 24 Tex. Crim. I, 5 S.W. 510 (1887).
64, Id at 3, 5 S.W. at 510.
65. Id. at 2, 5 S.W. at 510.
66. Id. at 3, 5 S.W. at 510-11.
67. Id. at 3, 5 S.W. at 511.
68. Id
69. 47 Tex. Crim. 611, 85 S.W. 797 (1905).
70. 1d. at 612, 85 S.W. at 797.
71. Id., 85 S.W. at 798. Furthermore, the recipient was not a minor; so, morals of youth
were not affected. Id.






offensive definition of "cock," the court refused to find the defendant
guilty without an explanation of the vulgar connotation, whatever might
have been the driver's motive. 76 Therefore, intent alone would not support
an obscenity conviction in Texas, even if the publisher specifically
designed his message to corrupt the morals of youth.
By the turn of the century the Texas Legislature had expanded obscenity
regulation beyond the focus on children as the most susceptible or at least
the most impressionable members of society. The 1925 Texas Penal Code
prohibited publication "of scandals, whoring, lechery, assignations, in-
trigues between men and women and immoral conduct of persons."'77 In
addition, the penalty increased from the $100 maximum of the prior stat-
utes78 to a prison term of as long as five years. 79 As in other jurisdictions
with similar statutes, the Texas courts strictly interpreted the law based on
the Hicklin rule. 80 For example, in Garcia v. State8 1 the court affirmed the
conviction of a newsstand owner for possessing for sale Confessions of a
Young Venus, a pamphlet allegedly describing and depicting sexual in-
trigues between a man and woman.82 The court was convinced that the
pamphlet was immoral and expressed surprise only at the leniency of the
jury in assessing the lowest penalty, two years in jail.8 3
With the advent of the Roth decision in 1957, the legislature for the first
time was required to conform Texas's obscenity laws to a federal constitu-
tional standard.84 The legislature changed the Penal Code to reflect the
Roth standard, including specific words from the decision such as "con-
temporary community standards. '85 Additionally, the statute defined the
applicable community as "no. . .less than the State of Texas." 86
The importance of Roth in interpreting the new statute became evident
in Malone v. State.8 7 In Malone a conviction for promulgating immoral
publications was overturned because the lower court had failed to instruct
the jury to apply the Roth test. The defendant had requested a charge that
instructed jurors not to consider the magazine in separate portions but
rather to judge the work as a whole, using standards of literature sold in
the community.88 The trial court's refusal to issue a Roth charge was held
76. Id
77. Tex. Penal Code art. 527 (1925).
78. See id. art. 399 (1857); id art. 343 (1879); id art. 365 (1895).
79. Id art. 527 (1925).
80. For a discussion of Hicklin, see notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
81. 141 Tex. Crim. 444, 149 S.W.2d 113 (1941).
82. Id. at 445, 149 S.W.2d at 113.
83. Id
84. For a discussion of Roth, see notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
85. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 527(3) (Vernon Supp. 1962). Article 527 tested ob-
scenity by "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests. Provided,
further, . . . the term 'contemporary community standards' shall in no case involve a terri-
tory or geographic area less than the State of Texas." See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957).
86. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 527(3) (Vernon Supp. 1962).
87. 170 Tex. Crim. 231, 339 S.W.2d 666 (1960).
88. Id at 233, 339 S.W.2d at 668.
1981] 1209
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
to constitute reversible error. 89 Then, in Carter v. State9" the court found
that the statutory definition of community as not less than the State of
Texas was consistent with the Roth requirement. 9 1 The interpretation im-
posed another variation on the most susceptible person test. Obscenity was
to be judged by its effect on the most sensitive communities in the state.
Theoretically, material unacceptable in Dime Box, Texas, also was unac-
ceptable in Dallas. In fact, though, localized standards could be applied
because local jurors were the ones who determined the community stan-
dards, 92 and they hardly knew the standards of every city and town in the
state. Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirmed the ju-
rors' right to disbelieve the conclusions of experts and even judges that the
material was obscene.9 3
Although the Roth decision placed certain constitutional limitations on
obscenity regulation, Roth did not destroy the ability of states or localities
to enact different statutes shielding children from obscenity. For example,
through 1969 article 527 of the Texas Penal Code punished the sale of
lewd or suggestive comic books.94 Additionally, the city of Dallas enacted
an ordinance establishing a film classification board to determine which
movies were suitable for persons younger than sixteen. 95 A challenge to
that ordinance in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas96 resulted in a
decision that foreshadowed the Miller standard for specificity. Although
the Court in Interstate Circuit recognized the city's right to protect mi-
nors, 97 it held the ordinance unconstitutional because its vagueness gave
unbridled discretion to the censor. 98 The Court also observed that the reg-
89. Id. at 234, 339 S.W.2d at 668.
90. 388 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
91. Id (citing Baxter v. State, 363 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963)).
92. The Supreme Court cautioned against defining "community" too narrowly in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), how-
ever, the Court held that the trial court is not required to specify what community should be
considered in applying the appropriate test of obscenity.
93. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court stated that juries are
permitted to draw on their knowledge of the community to decide what conclusion the aver-
age person applying contemporary community standards would reach. The trial court, how-
ever, is not precluded from admitting expert testimony. See generally Comment, supra note
41; see also United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.) (en banc), (literature and psy-
chology experts testify that material is not obscene), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969
(1973).
94. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 527b (Vernon Supp. 1956).
95. DALLAS, TEX., REV. CODE ch. 46A (1960).
96. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
97. Id at 684. The Court affirmed the right of the state to prohibit the display of ex-
plicit sexual material to minors in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968).
98. 390 U.S. at 688. Noting that the only limit on the censor's discretion under the
ordinance was his understanding of what was meant by the terms "desirable, acceptable or
proper," the Court found that such latitude was too wide. Id. (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 701 (1959) (Clark, J., concurring)).
See also Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam) (striking down film licensing
standards due to unconstitutional vagueness); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (striking down statute allowing film censorship for sacrilege).
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court stated that for a prior censorship
system to pass constitutional muster, it must include procedural safeguards designed to obvi-
ate the danger of abuse. Id at 58. These include placing the burden of proof on the censor,
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ulation affected the rights of adults because with limited hope for profits
from more mature pictures, filmmakers and theater owners might produce
and show only the "totally inane." 99 Noting that the Dallas ordinance
might be used as a model for other cities,'00 the Court struck down the
ordinance before such a law could proliferate across the country.
One year later, in Stein v. Batchelor,'0' a federal district court declared
unconstitutional article 527 of the Texas Penal Code. Citing overbreadth
as the statute's major defect, the court stated that the statute should have
been confined to public or commercial dissemination. ' 0 2 Furthermore, the
court found that the statute failed to include the requirement that the ma-
terial be "utterly without redeeming social value," a standard mandated by
the Supreme Court's Memoirs decision. 10 3 The holding of unconstitution-
ality had little effect, however, as the legislature already had changed the
law. The Stein court struck down the contested article 527 on June 9,
1969; its successor took effect the next day. 104
After the revised article 527 took effect, Alton A. West was convicted of
exhibiting obscene material, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals af-
firmed the conviction in West v. State. 10 5 The United States Supreme
Court granted West's petition for certiorari 1 6 and vacated the judgment in
light of Miller v. California, a decision rendered four months earlier that
required specific statutory examples of the prohibited conduct.' 0 7 On re-
mand the court of criminal appeals affirmed West's conviction. 0 8 The
conviction was upheld again on motion for rehearing. 0 9 In both the origi-
nal appeal and on remand the criminal appeals court construed article 527
to prohibit the offensive treatment of all sexual matters. The court rea-
soned that because the language of the statute was all-inclusive it included
the examples of obscenity given in Miller even though the examples were
not specifically set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the court concluded
allowing restraint only for a brief specified period of time, and affording prompt judicial
review. Id; see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (reversing
decision of municipal board not to allow program in auditorium due to lack of procedural
safeguards).
99. 390 U.S. at 684. The United States Supreme Court struck down a "most susceptible
persons" statute that prohibited distribution to adults of material that was harmful to minors
in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
100. 390 U.S. at 684.
101. 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (no finding of irreparable injury and therefore no
basis for federal interference in state prosecution), vacatedsub nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S.
200 (1971); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 527 (Vernon Supp. 1962).
102. 300 F. Supp. at 607.
103. Id at 607-08.
104. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 527 (Vernon Supp. 1970). The 1969 Code defined ob-
scenity in terms of "the description or representation of sexual matters." Id
105. 489 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 961 (1973). The defend-
ant had shown a 16 mm. film of women who disrobed and feigned self-induced sexual satis-
faction.
106. West v. Texas, 414 U.S. 961 (1973).
107. Id.
108. West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433, rek. denied, 514 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
109. 514 S.W.2d at 441.
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that article 527 was definitive enough to provide the appropriate notice.'1°
In considering West's motion for rehearing, the court decided that it had
erred in its construction of the statute. Because article 527 did not specifi-
cally define the sexual conduct intended to be prohibited, the court re-
sorted to judicial construction'' to restrict the term "sexual matters" to
the examples set forth in Miller.' 12 The court, however, affirmed the con-
viction, concluding that any vagueness in the statute had been cured by a
decision prior to West that had found pictures of men and women engaged
in sexual intercourse obscene.' 13 The film in West had depicted similar
activities, and therefore the court reasoned that the defendant had notice
of the state standard sufficient to satisfy Miller. 1"4
In 1974 a new Penal Code took effect in Texas." 5 To comport with
Miller, the legislature subsequently revised the obscenity statutes in
1975.' 16 Then, in 1979 the current set of obscenity laws took effect.' 17
III. THE CURRENT STATUTES
A. Section 43.21
This section contains definitions of the terms used in the obscenity stat-
utes, including the definition of obscene.' 18 The 1979 version differs sig-
110. Id. at 440-41.
Ill. Id. at 445.
112. See note 54 supra.
113. See Phelper v. State, 396 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
114. 514 S.W.2d at 445.
115. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 43.21-.24 (Vernon 1974); Bubany, Texas Penal Code
of 1974, 28 Sw. L.J. 292 (1974); Steele, The Impact of the New Penal Code on First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 38 TEX. B.J. 245, 251-52 (1975).
116. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). Section 43.25, punishing
the use of children in obscenity, was added in 1977. Id. § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
117. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21, .23, .25 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see notes 118-
186 infra and accompanying text.
118. Section 43.21 provides:
(a) In this subchapter:
(I) "Obscene" means material or a performance that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(B) depicts or describes:
(i) patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sex-
ual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including sexual inter-
course, sodomy, and sexual bestiality; or
(ii) patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, sadism, masochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals,
the male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal,
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state or a device designed
and marketed as useful primarily for stimulation of the human genital
organs; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scien-
tific value.
(2) "Material" means anything tangible that is capable of being used or
adapted to arouse interest, whether through the medium of reading, observa-
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nificantly from its predecessor." 19 Subsection (a)(1)(A) adopts language
directly from Miller, incorporating the community standards test and lim-
iting the purview of the statute to sex. 120 In contrast, the 1975 amendments
had attempted to impose the limitation in a patchwork way by removing
language from the 1974 Penal Code that had defined obscenity in terms of
tion, sound, or in any other manner, but does not include an actual three di-
mensional obscene device.
(3) "Performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibi-
tion performed before an audience.
(4) "Patently offensive" means so offensive on its face as to affront current
community standards of decency.
(5) "Promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail,
deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present,
exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.
(6) "Wholesale promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, provide, mail,
deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, or to offer
or agree to do the same for purpose of resale.
(7) "Obscene device" means a device including a dildo or artificial vagina,
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs.
(b) If any of the depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct described in
this section are declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unlawfully
included herein, this declaration shall not invalidate this section as to other
patently offensive sexual conduct included herein.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
119. As amended in 1975, § 43.21 stated the following:
In this subchapter:
(1) "Obscene" means having as a whole a dominant theme that:
(A) appeals to the prurient interest of the average person applying con-
temporary community standards;
(B) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and
(C) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
(2) "Material" means a book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or
written material; a picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pic-
torial representation; a play, dance, or performance; a statue or other figure; a
recording, transcription, or mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction;
or other article, equipment, or machine.
(3) "Prurient interest" means an interest in sexual conduct that goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation
of such conduct. If it appears from the character of the material or the cir-
cumstances of its dissemination that the subject matter is designed for a spe-
cially susceptible audience, the appeal of the subject matter shall be judged
with reference to such audience.
(4) "Distribute" means to transfer possession, whether with or without
consideration.
(5) "Commercially distribute" means to transfer possession for valuable
consideration.
(6) "Sexual conduct" means:
(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person;
(B) any contact between the female sex organ and the male sex organ;
(C) any contact between a person's mouth or genitals and the anus or
genitals of an animal or fowl; or
(D) patently offensive representations of masturbation or excretory
functions.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
120. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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"sex, nudity, or excretion"' 2 1 and replacing it with words consistent with
Ailler. 122
The new subsection (a)(1)(B) provides the specificity the Supreme Court
requires in an obscenity statute. The Miller Court gave examples of the
type of conduct a state may prohibit, 23 and the legislature included the
examples in the 1979 Penal Code. In subsections (a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) the legis-
lature expanded upon the Miller examples as well as the stop-gap list that
it had added in 1975.124 Under subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) the appearance of
sexual stimulation is proscribed. In addition, a patently offensive depic-
tion or representation of "covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid
state" is obscene. 25 The prohibition against such a depiction arguably
conflicts with the Supreme Court's mandate that only hard-core pornogra-
phy be punished.' 26 Further, the use of the term "patent offensiveness"
only begs the question of what is obscene. 27 Finally, while the obscenity
of a depiction of the genitals can be judged on the basis of public lewdness
and indecent exposure statutes, 128 no statute exists for judging the obscen-
ity of covered male genitals. Jurors therefore are left to intuit when such a
depiction is obscene. Heretofore, such a decision was not necessary be-
cause the law did not punish representations of covered male genitals, dis-
cernibly turgid or otherwise.
Subsection (a)(l)(B)(ii) also defines as obscene the depiction or descrip-
tion of a device used for genital stimulation. The previous statutory defini-
tions did not include such devices, 29 and the law did not criminalize them
as does the new section 43.23.130 Subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) raises serious
questions of interpretation as to what is an obscene device. Many brand-
121. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21(i)(A) (Vernon 1974).
122. Under the 1975 Code, subsection (1)(A) replaced "a prurient interest in sex, nudity,
or excretion" with "the prurient interest of the average person applying contemporary com-
munity standards." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
123. For the examples given in Miller, see note 54 supra.
124. For the 1975 version of § 43.21(6), see note 119 supra.
125. The Miller Court had cited an Oregon law, OR. REV. STAT. § 255(5) (1971) (current
version at OR. REV. STAT. § 167.060(5) (1979)), proscribing inter alia "covered human male
genitals in a discernibly turgid state" as an example of the precision required in regulation.
See 413 U.S. at 24 n.6. While the Court did not rule on the Oregon subsection specifically,
its general endorsement of the language of the whole statute indicates that such language
might be acceptable to the current Court.
126. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1973).
127. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Subsection
(a)(4) defines patent offensiveness as that which affronts contemporary community standards
of decency. What offends these standards is the question. Prior to a jury determination, one
cannot tell which depictions or representations of "covered male genitals in a discernibly
turgid state" are obscene and which are not.
128. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.07 (Vernon 1974) defines public lewdness as knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or contact, normal or deviate, in public or doing so anywhere
with reckless disregard as to who is present and will be offended. Id § 21.08 defines inde-
cent exposure as exposing one's anus or genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify another's
sexual desire with reckless disregard of who is present and will be offended.
129. Id. § 43.21 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977); see note 119 supra for the text of former
§ 43.21.




name companies are marketing products designed for genital stimula-
tion.' 3' The statute proscribes promotion of such products and their depic-
tion or description only if they are "designed or marketed as useful
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs."1 32 To avoid prose-
cution, manufacturers most likely will market their devices as useful for
stimulating many parts of the body. 133 The company that dares to disclose
the true function of the device runs the risk of indictment, even though its
product may not differ at all from others of supposedly more general use.
Subsection (a)(l)(C) is derived directly from the Miller decision and re-
flects the abandonment of the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social
value" requirement in favor of the less protective "taken as a whole lacks
serious . . . value" test. The evolution began when the 1974 Penal Code
included the Memoirs test. The 1975 amendment then changed the test to
resemble more closely the Miller language.' 34 Now, the Texas law tracks
the Supreme Court decision almost verbatim. 35
Subsections (a)(2)-(3) of section 43.21 define obscene material and ob-
scene performance, respectively. The new definition of obscene material is
written in more general terms than was its predecessor. The 1974 statute
set out the types of media, such as book or photograph. 136 The 1979 ver-
sion, however, defines obscene material in terms of the senses. Perform-
ance is defined as a play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition before
an audience. An overlap arguably exists between subsections (a)(2) and
(a)(3) as both could be read to include motion pictures. As a result, prose-
cutors may choose to pursue purveyors of obscene films under either defi-
nition. The significance of the overlap is that under section 43.23137 a
conviction for obscene material constitutes a third degree felony 138 while
under sections 43.22139 and 43.23140 a conviction for an obscene perform-
ance is only a misdemeanor.' l4
Subsection (a)(4) defines the phrase "patently offensive" in terms of af-
fronting "current community standards of decency."' 42 The term is used
131. See Swartz, For the Woman Who Has A/most Everything, ESQUIRE, July 1980, at 56.
132. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
133. See Swartz, supra note 131, at 62-63.
134. Subsection (I)(C) of the 1975 amendment replaced "utterly without redeeming so-
cial value" with "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 43.21(1)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
135. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(1)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The only dif-
ference between the language of this section and Miller is the use of the conjunction "and"
rather than "or."
136. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21(2) (Vernon 1974).
137. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
138. A third degree felony carries a sentence of two to ten years imprisonment and as
much as a $5,000 fine. Id. §§ 12.34(a)-(b) (Vernon 1974).
139. Id. § 43.22(b).
140. Id. § 43.23(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
141. A class A misdemeanor carries a sentence of as long as one year imprisonment and
a fine of as much as $2,000. Id. §§ 12.21(l)-(3) (Vernon 1974). A class C misdemeanor
carries a fine of up to $200. Id § 12.23.
142. Id § 43.21(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Miller, however, ties patent offensive-
ness to the conduct defined by state law, not to community standards; thus, the Court ap-
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in conjunction with subsections (a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii), which set out in detail
what is obscene.' 43 Read together, the subsections constitute a "shopping
list" of what may be found obscene, but they give little guidance to jurors
as to how to determine which sexual acts, for example, affront current
community standards of decency. Juries, apparently, must act on intui-
tion. The specificity of subsections (a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii) only limits the class
within which the jury may exercise such intuition. The statute, however,
no longer allows the trier of fact to judge material by its effect on the most
susceptible person as the Hicklin rule had required.'"
Section 43.21 of the 1979 statute also changes the language describing
the promulgation of obscenity. Formerly, the law spoke of distribution
and commercial distribution, both of which involved a transfer of posses-
sion.' 45 Subsections (a)(5)-(6) now deal with promotion and wholesale
promotion, respectively. Although the definitions have been made more
specific, the major change is that the transfer of possession no longer is
required. Offering or agreeing to promote now is sufficient to constitute an
offense. 146
B. Section 43.22
This section 47 remains unchanged, but its utility is now questionable as
it attempts to salvage something from the discarded Hicklin rule. Under
the statute, one who recklessly disregards the fact that a person present
may be offended by obscene material is guilty of a misdemeanor. The
offense is judged in terms of the particular audience, a remnant of the
Hicklin most susceptible person approach.' 48 Moreover, because section
pears to have reserved the right to review such a finding, as it arguably is not within the
jury's community standards determination. See 413 U.S. at 27. For a discussion of what
constitutes "community," see notes 92-93 supra.
143. The list is an expanded version of the examples given in Miller. See note 54 supra.
144. For a discussion of the Hicklin rule, see notes 19-35 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 43.21(4)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
146. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.23(a), (c)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Previ-
ously, the law had prohibited only possession for sale. The mere intent to give, provide, or
lend obscenity in a noncommercial context, and the mere intent to offer to do the same was
not an offense. Commentary accompanying § 43.22 indicates that the legislative intent was
to protect an unwilling observer, a goal sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Redrup v. State,
386 U.S. 767 (1967), involving a New York statute. But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at
27 ("No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the regulating state law .
147. Section 43.22 states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly displays
or distributes an obscene photograph, drawing, or similar visual representa-
tion or other obscene material and is reckless about whether a person is pres-
ent who will be offended or alarmed by the display or distribution.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.22 (Vernon 1974).
148. See notes 19-35 supra and accompanying text. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited drive-in
theaters from showing nudity, even though passers-by might be offended. The Court, how-
ever, implied that a tightly drawn ordinance requiring such theaters to shield the screen
from public view would pass constitutional muster. Id at 215 n. 13. But see Mishkin v. New
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43.22 was not updated by the legislature, its language does not conform to
that in section 43.21, the new definitional statute. Section 43.22 uses the
term "distributes," the word used in the 1974 Penal Code. As noted above,
however, the 1979 statute replaces distribution with the concept of promo-
tion. 149 As a result, the new statute does not define a term crucial to sec-
tion 43.22. Furthermore, section 43.22 is redundant. Section 43.23
punishes the promotion of obscenity, 50 and promotion as defined in sec-
tion 43.21 includes the concepts of exhibition and presentation as well as
distribution. Accordingly, both the display and distribution elements pres-
ent in section 43.22 are subsumed in section 43.23. The only element of
section 43.22 not present in section 43.23 is the most susceptible person
test, and the constitutionality of that standard is doubtful in light of Roth
and its progeny. Finally, the punishment is less severe under section 43.22,
wherein offenses are categorized as class C misdemeanors than under sec-
tion 43.23, wherein they rank as class A misdemeanors.
C. Section 43.23
This section punishes what now is termed promotion of obscenity.' 5'
The new statute differs from its predecessor' 52 both in language and penal-
ties. Subsection (a) adopts the term "wholesale promotion" in place of
"commercial distribution." As defined in section 43.21, promotion need
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (upholding conviction for distributing literature of a particular
fetish to persons disposed toward that fetish and judging the prurient interest by the mate-
rial's appeal to that particular group rather than to the average person).
149. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
150. Section 43.23 is set forth in note 151 infra.
151. Section 43.23 provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing its content and character, he
wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale promote any obscene
material or obscene device.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a) of this section is a felony of the third
degree.
(c) A person commits an offense if, knowing its content and character, he:(1) promotes or possesses with intent to promote any obscene material
or obscene device; or
(2) produces, presents, or directs an obscene performance or participates
in a portion thereof that is obscene or that contributes to its obscenity.(d) An offense under Subsection (c) of this section is a Class A misde-
meanor.
(e) A person who promotes or wholesale promotes obscene material or an
obscene device or possesses the same with intent to promote or wholesale pro-
mote it in the course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of its
content and character.
(f) A person who possesses six or more obscene devices or identical or
similar obscene articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote the
same.(g) This section does not apply to a person who possesses or distributes
obscene material or obscene devices or participates in conduct otherwise pre-
scribed [sic] by this section when the possession, participation, or conduct oc-
curs in the course of law enforcement activities.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
152. In the 1974 Penal Code, § 43.23 read as follows:
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not include actual transfer of possession. 153 As a result, merely intending
to agree to provide obscene material or an obscene device for resale vio-
lates section 43.23. As in the 1974 statute, the defendant still must possess
the requisite mens rea before he can be found guilty. An offense is com-
mitted only if the accused knows the character and content of the material
or device. The new version, however, creates a presumption of knowledge
on the part of the commercial promoter. 154 In addition, the penalty for
such activity has been increased from a class B misdemeanor to a third
degree felony.
Other offenses under section 43.23 have been upgraded from class B'55
to class A misdemeanors. 56 Subsection (c)(1) prohibits not only the non-
commercial promotion of obscenity but also the mere possession with in-
tent to promote. Subsection (f) creates a presumption that one who
possesses six or more obscene devices or identical or similar obscene arti-
cles intends to promote them. 157 Further, the presumption triggers the
subsection (e) presumption that one who intends to promote has the neces-
sary mens rea. As a result of this chain of presumptions, the person who
merely possesses six or more devices or similar articles is presumed guilty
of a subsection (c)(1) offense. The violence that these presumptions do to
the concept of "innocent until proven guilty" is underscored by the fact
that private possession of obscenity is protected by the first amendment. 158
Subsection (g) does not discriminate between the adult bookstore owner
and the adult who has obscene books for his own use. The subsection
operates equally against the commercial distributor and the private citizen.
(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing the content of the material:
(I) he sells, commercially distributes, commercially exhibits, or pos-
sesses for sale, commercial distribution, or commercial exhibition any ob-
scene material;
(2) he presents or directs an obscene play, dance, or performance or par-
ticipates in that portion of the play, dance, or performance that makes it
obscene; or
(3) he hires, employs, or otherwise uses a person under the age of 17
years to achieve any of the purposes set out in Subdivisions (I) and (2) of
this subsection.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
obscene material was possessed by a person having scientific, educational,
governmental, or other similar justification.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor unless commit-
ted under Subsection (a)(3) of this section, in which event it is a Class A mis-
demeanor.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.23 (Vernon 1974).
153. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
154. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). New York's
statute has a similar presumption. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10(1) (McKinney 1980). See
also People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 295 N.E.2d 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70, appealdismissed
sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 948 (1973) (dismissing an appeal to the en-
forcement of the New York obscenity laws).
155. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.23(c) (Vernon 1974).
156. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
157. New York has a similar presumption. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10(2) (McKin-
ney 1980).
158. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1964). The Court implied, however, that such
protection was limited to in-home use. Id. at 565.
[Vol. 341218
COMMENTS
To the extent that the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the private
possessor, the subsection is overbroad. Unless the state can show that the
presumption more likely than not flows from the proven fact, the posses-
sion of six or more devices or articles, the statute may be unconstitu-
tional.' 59 The shift in the burden of proof is new to Texas's obscenity law
and creates a danger of police harassment of individuals who choose to
read or watch explicit sexual material privately and who are entitled to do
so constitutionally. The potential public embarrassment of an arrest and
the expense of a trial may create a chilling effect 160 on the exercise of first
amendment rights.
Subsection (c)(2) punishes participation in an obscene performance.
The subsection is similar to subsection (a)(2) in the prior statute. The new
version, however, expands the coverage to include not only participation in
a portion of the performance that makes the presentation obscene but also
participation in a portion that merely contributes to the obscenity. The
difference may be nothing more than semantics,' 61 but under the new sec-
tion 43.23 one need not expose himself to be guilty. Rather, participation
in a performance in which someone else does so may suffice.
The new statute also deletes the affirmative defense of the previous stat-
ute. Formerly, persons possessing pornography for scientific, educational,
governmental, or other justifiable purposes were protected from prosecu-
tion. New subsection (g) limits justifiable use to law enforcement activi-
ties. Law enforcement activity, however, is hardly the only justifiable use
for explicit material. In its revised version section 43.23 allows no protec-
tion to those conducting sex research, be it psychological, medical, or
clinical. Therefore, an academician studying responses to sexually explicit
material could be indicted for simply providing the material to his sub-
ject, 162 and his student assistant could be indicted for agreeing to help pro-
vide the material. 163 Therapists could be prosecuted for engaging in the
159. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumption is regarded as irrational
and arbitrary unless shown that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it depends); Shinall v. Worrell, 319 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.C. 1970)
(presumption that possessor of more than three copies of obscene material intends to dissem-
inate them is arbitrary and therefore invalid); Morrison v. Wilson, 307 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.
Fla. 1969) (presumption from transportation of two copies of any obscene publication or five
copies of several publications that they are intended for sale violates due process clause and
privilege against self-incrimination).
160. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (striking down loyalty oath for teachers);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (striking down use of civil libel statute to
punish criticism of government officials). But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. i, 13-14 (1972)
("[a]ilegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for ... a threat of spe-
cific future harm" to confer standing). See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitu-
tional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
161. In substance, subsection (c)(2) resembles the related offenses of public lewdness,
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1974), and public indecency. Id. § 21.08.
162. The library of the University of Texas School of Law contains a collection of sexual
material called "litigated literature." Included are publications that have figured promi-
nently in court cases. Theoretically, by allowing access to these materials, the University
may run afoul of the obscenity laws.
163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21, .23 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), require only the
intent to transfer possession.
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practice of providing adult material and devices to cure impotence and
frigidity. Although prosecutors probably will not pursue scientific and ed-
ucational "promoters" vigorously, nothing prevents them from doing so
under section 43.23. Further, the threat of selective enforcement has be-
come quite real. A district attorney facing a difficult reelection fight might
make headlines by prosecuting a legitimate sex researcher in a conserva-
tive community. In revising section 43.23, the legislature invited such har-
assment.
D. Section 43.24
This section also remains unchanged,' 64 expressing the long-established
belief that the state has a special interest in protecting minors from obscen-
ity.' 65 To that extent, the section stands as a variation on the Hicklin rule,
measuring obscenity by its effect on the most susceptible person. Unlike
other sections that speak in terms of obscenity, section 43.24 prohibits the
sale, distribution, or display of "harmful material."' 166 The assumption of
the legislature is clear: Sexual material is not merely something that chil-
dren are unprepared to see; it is something that may harm them.
The test for determining harmfulness resembles the community stan-
dards test for determining obscenity, but under section 43.24 harmful ma-
terial is judged by the "prevailing standards in the adult community as a
164. Section 43.24 provides:
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Minor" means an individual younger than 17 years.
(2) "Harmful material" means material whose dominant theme taken as
a whole:
(A) appeals to the prurient interest of a minor, in sex, nudity, or ex-
cretion;
(B) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult commu-
nity as a whole with respect to what is suitable for minors; and
(C) is utterly without redeeming social value for minors.
(b) A person commits an offense if, knowing that the material is harmful:
(1) and knowing the person is a minor, he sells, distributes, exhibits, or
possesses for sale, distribution, or exhibition to a minor harmful material;
(2) he displays harmful material and is reckless about whether a minor
is present who will be offended or alarmed by the display; or
(3) he hires, employs, or uses a minor to do or accomplish or assist in
doing or accomplishing any of the acts prohibited in Subsection (b)(I) or
(b)(2) of this section.
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) the sale, distribution, or exhibition was by a person having scientific,
educational, governmental, or other similar justification; or
(2) the sale, distribution, or exhibition was to a minor who was accom-
panied by a consenting parent, $uardian, or spouse.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor unless it is
committed under Subsection (b)(3) of this section in which event it is a felony
of the third degree.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.24 (Vernon 1974).
165. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) (per
curiam); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944).
166. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.24(b) (Vernon 1974).
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whole with respect to what is suitable for minors."' 167 In addition, patent
offensiveness by those standards is necessary for a finding of harmfulness,
but it is not sufficient. As in the obscenity statutes, the material must also
appeal to the child's prurient interest in sex, but unlike the adult standards,
prurient interest in mere nudity will support a conviction. Thus the
prohibitions in the children's statute go beyond those in the adult statute.
Adult standards are not applicable to children, 168 however; so, section
43.24's nudity component might survive a constitutional challenge.
If, as the statute implies, nudity can be harmful to minors, its use in an
instructional context might be threatened. Section 43.24, however, reduces
that possibility by preserving the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming so-
cial value" test. 169 Nevertheless, the subject is a volatile one. For exam-
ple, the sex education book Show Me has been banned from public
libraries in some communities.' 70 The book displays normal growing chil-
dren, but its nude photographs have caused concern across the state.
While subsection (c) provides an affirmative defense for educational uses,
communities that have banned books like Show Me will be less likely to
find such an educational purpose being served. In the final analysis, sec-
tion 43.24 defers to parental discretion as subsection (c)(2) sets forth a de-
fense for distribution to a minor who was accompanied by a consenting
parent, guardian, or spouse.
E. Section 43.25
The legislature's concern about the use of children to produce pornogra-
phy is expressed in this section.' 7' The 1979 changes make the law consid-
167. Id. § 43.24(a)(2)(B).
168. The Supreme Court has recognized that standards of obscenity for children may
differ from those for adults. For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978), the Court upheld the FCC's ability to regulate a radio broadcast of George Carlin's
"filthy words" comedy routine when prompted by the complaint of a parent whose young
son heard the broadcast.
169. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.24(a)(2)(C) (Vernon 1974).
170. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 64.
171. Section 43.25 provides:
(a) In this section:
(1) "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof that
includes sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age.
(2) "Obscene sexual performance" means any performance that in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age of any mate-
rial that is obscene, as that term is defined by Section 43.21 of this code.
(3) "Sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, de-
viate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic
abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.
(4) "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph, dance,
or other visual representation that is exhibited before an audience.
(5) "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide,
lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, dissemi-
nate, present, exhibit, or advertise or to offer or agree to do any of the
above.
(6) "Simulated" means the explicit depiction of sexual conduct that cre-
ates the appearance of actual sexual conduct and during which the persons
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erably more specific than the 1977 version 172 that had been declared
unconstitutional in Graham v. Hi/..17 3 The 1977 language did not require a
showing of obscenity to sustain a conviction. Rather, the statute punished
the commercial use of pictures of minors engaging in sexual conduct or
observing sexual conduct. The Graham court stated that the law would
have been upheld had it been limited to depiction of engaging in actual
engaging in the conduct exhibit any uncovered portion of the breasts, geni-
tals, or buttocks.
(7) "Deviate sexual intercourse" has the meaning defined by Section
43.01 of this code.
(8) "Sado-masochistic abuse" has the meaning defined by Section 43.24
of this code.
(b) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content
thereof, he employes [sic], authorizes, or induces a child younger than 17 years
of age to engage in a sexual performance. A parent or legal guardian or custo-
dian of a child younger than 17 years of age commits an offense if he consents
to the participation by the child in a sexual performance.
(c) An offense under Subsection (b) of this section is a felony of the second
degree.
(d) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content of
the material, he produces, directs, or promotes an obscene performance that
includes sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age.
(e) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content of
the material, he produces, directs, or promotes a performance that includes
sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age.
(f) An offense under Subsection (d) or (e) of this section is a felony of the
third degree.
(g) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the
defendant, in good faith, reasonably believed that the person who engaged in
the sexual conduct was 17 years of age or older.
(h) When it becomes necessary for the purposes of this section to deter-
mine whether a child who participated in sexual conduct was younger than 17
years of age, the court or jury may make this determination by any of the
following methods:
(I) personal inspection of the child;
(2) inspection of the photograph or motion picture that shows the child
engaging in the sexual performance;
(3) oral testimony by a witness to the sexual performance as to the age
of the child based on the child's appearance at the time;
(4) expert medical testimony based on the appearance of the child en-
gaging in the sexual performance; or(5) any other method authorized by law or by the rules of evidence at
common law. '
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
172. The 1977 version of § 43.25 read as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, knowing the content of the material,
he sells, commercially distributes, commercially exhibits, or possesses for sale,
commercial distribution, or commercial exhibition any motion picture or pho-
tograph showing a person younger than 17 years of age observing or engaging
in sexual conduct.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
obscene material was possessed by a person having scientific, educational,
governmental, or other similar justification.
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
173. 444 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
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sexual conduct. 174 Because it was not so limited, the court struck down the
statute as overbroad. The legislature then produced the current section
43.25, which was designed to meet the court's objection.
While the state law existing in 1979 already prohibited the abuse of chil-
dren to produce obscene material, 175 section 43.25 expanded the prohibi-
tion to include providers of children who do not actually touch the
children themselves. 176 Subsection (a) sets out the definitions applicable to
section 43.25. Children are those younger than seventeen. Sexual conduct
is described in a "shopping list" that resembles the actions set out in sec-
tion 43.21(a)(l)(B)(i)-(ii). Under subsection (b), a person commits an of-
fense if he knowingly employs, authorizes, or induces a child to engage in
any of these activities. A parent or guardian also can be convicted for
consenting to the participation. The crime is categorized as a second de-
gree felony,' 77 and producing, directing, or promoting 78 such a perform-
ance qualifies as a third degree felony.' 79 The law thus imposes a penalty
on those who provide the children for the performance and those who
make use of the children to produce the pictures. Because promotion is
not limited to commercial distribution, the statute applies equally to the
private citizen who shares photos with his friends and the dealer who sells
the material in a bookstore.' 80 Once the material reaches the citizen, the
state cannot act because private possession of obscenity is constitutionally
protected.' 8 ' Agreeing to share obscene material is a different question,
though, and is one that arguably fits within the purview of the state law.
Section 43.25 is not a strict liability statute. Subsection (g) sets forth an
affirmative defense for lack of mens rea. A person who reasonably be-
lieves that the child is seventeen or older is not guilty of an offense under
the statute. This approach may be contrasted with Texas's statutory rape
law, which does not allow such a defense.' 82
Subsection (h) of section 43.25 outlines the methods for determining the
174. Id. at 592. See generally Comment, Preying on Playgrounds.- The Sexploilation of
Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 809 (1978).
175. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.09 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 43.23 (Vernon 1974).
176. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.25(b), (d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). During
1977 and 1978 political pressure increased to toughen child pornography laws. A Select
Committee of the Texas House investigated the causes of the problem and explored pos-
sibilities for its control. See generaly HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12. More than 50 wit-
nesses testified in hearings held across the state. Id at 195-98. The Committee found a
thriving market in Texas for sexual material involving children. Id at 62-78. Purchasers
were receiving magazines, books, and films from three sources: commercial bookstores, mail
order suppliers, and private citizens. Id at 66, 69, 74.
177. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
178. Id §§ 43.25(d)-(e).
179. Id § 43.25(f).
180. These are two of the three outlets itemized in the House Committee Report. See
note 176 supra. The third outlet, mail distribution, is the responsibility of the federal gov-
ernment. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 69-73.
181. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
182. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.09 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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age of a child. The subsection includes both formal 183 and informal 84
procedures. The informal options may prove to be quite important in
many cases because the actors in child pornography are often runaways, 185
and documentary evidence of the children's ages may not be readily avail-
able. Under section 43.25 the determination of age may be based on such
imprecise methods as inspection of the child's picture and testimony as to
the child's appearance at the time of the performance. Official or expert
information is not necessary. Rather, any of the approaches itemized in
subsection (h) may be sufficient. Moreover, the affirmative defense of sub-
section (g) does not depend on an actual finding that the actor was seven-
teen or older. All that the law requires is a reasonable, good faith belief. 186
Thus, subsection (h) aids the prosecution more than the defense because it
allows more flexibility in proving minority. Without such proof, a convic-
tion under section 43.25 could not be obtained.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Soon after the 1979 statutes took effect, their constitutionality was chal-
lenged. In Houston the United States District Court granted a temporary
restraining order enjoining the district attorney from enforcing sections
43.21 and 43.23.187 In Dallas another district court granted a similar re-
quest.18 8 Thereafter, both courts dissolved the orders, finding the statutes
constitutional. 89 Plaintiffs in both cases consolidated their appeals to the
Fifth Circuit. Until the court makes a decision, the 1979 statutes are being
enforced.
The appellants in these pending cases attack the statutes as being uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad, in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments.190 The appellees, the district attorneys, first contend that the
ambiguity arising from section 43.21's failure to define "prurient interest"
can be cured by judicial instruction to the jury.' 9 1 They defend other
183. Id. § 43.25(h)(4).
184. Id. §§ 43.25(h)(1)-(3).
185. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 93-95, 117-19.
186. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
187. See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 26,
1979) (dissolving temporary order restraining district attorney and denying request for per-
manent injunction).
188. See Crystal Theater, Inc. v. Wade, No. CA-3-79-1077-D (N.D. Tex., filed Oct. 26,
1979) (dissolving temporary order restraining district attorney and denying request for per-
manent injunction).
189. See notes 187-88 supra and accompanying text.
190. Brief for Appellants at 3, Crystal Theater, Inc. v. Wade, No. CA-3-79-1077-D (N.D.
Tex., filed Oct. 26, 1979); see Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued Judi-
cial Vagueness.- An Argumentfor Abandoning Obscenity as a Legal Concept, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 181 (1973); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844,
884 (1970).
191. Brief for Appellee at 24, Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 26, 1979). The appellees suggest that "prurient interest" could be defined as
it was in the prior version of § 43.21: "'Prurient interest' means an interest in sexual con-
duct that goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representa-
tion of such conduct." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21(3) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
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terms as being neither vague nor overbroad in context or on their face.192
Additionally, the state argues that the challenged prohibition of obscene
devices is constitutional in light of the Supreme Court's prior dismissal of
three appeals based on a similar Georgia statute. 193
The appellees also dispute any challenge to the double presumption of
section 43.23.194 Thiey urge a limited construction that would prevent a
prosecutor from applying both presumptions against the same defendant
in the same case.195 Although the statute itself does not contain any pro-
scription against the use of both presumptions, the appellees argue that an
ordinary rule of statutory construction requires an interpretation that will
make the statute constitutional and consistent with state law. 196 Thus, they
contend that article 43.23 should not be declared invalid on its face.
In addition to the Texas Penal Code's obscenity prohibitions, until 1980
Texas prosecutors also could use a civil nuisance statute to restrain com-
mercial obscenity.197 In Vance v. Universal Amusements Co.,19 8 however,
the Supreme Court held that article 4667(a), authorizing injunctions to
abate public nuisances, was unconstitutional. In Vance the district attor-
ney of Harris County sought to employ the statute to enjoin the operation
of an adult theater. 199 Section (a)(3) of the article allowed such a suit to
stop the habitual use of premises for commercial manufacture, distribu-
tion, or exhibition of obscene material. 2°° The United States Court of Ap-
192. Brief for Appellee at 26-34, Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 26, 1979). The terms defended were "material," "performance," "pro-
mote," "wholesale promote," and "patently offensive." But see United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. i, 7-8 (1947) (vague statute may be declared void when legislature reasonably could
have drafted more precise language).
193. Brief for Appellee at 35, Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 26, 1979); see Sewell v. State, 238 Ga. 495, 233 S.E.2d 187 (1977), appeal
disrmissedsub nom. Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Simpson v. State, 144 Ga. App.
657, 242 S.E.2d 265, appeal dismissed sub nom. Simpson v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 887 (1978);
Teal v. State, 143 Ga. App. 47, 238 S.E.2d 128 (1977), appeal dismissed sub nom. Teal v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 989 (1978).
194. Brief for Appellee at 38-45, Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 26, 1979); see Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Crystal Theater, Inc. v. Wade
No. CA-3-79-1077-D (N.D. Tex., filed Oct. 26, 1979). See also notes 154-58 supra and ac-
companying text. The possession of six or more similar articles or devices gives rise to a
presumption of intent to promote, which triggers a presumption of knowledge of the items'
content and character.
195. Brief for Appellee at 38-45, Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, No. H-79-1747 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 26, 1979). The presumptions are similar to those of N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 235.10 (McKinney 1980), which was upheld in People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 295
N.E.2d 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70, appeal dismissed sub na. Kirkpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S.
948 (1973).
196. But see Hart v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 537, 215 S.W.2d 883 (1948) (presumptions
upon presumptions cannot take the place of evidentiary facts).
197. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4667 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) allows prosecutors
to obtain injunctions to abate habitual use of premises for production or distribution of
obscenity. See Justice Sutherland's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 388 (1926), in which he stated that "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."
198. 100 S. Ct. 1156, 63 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1980).
199. Id at 1157-58, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 416.
200. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4667(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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peals for the Fifth Circuit found that the statute unconstitutionally
authorized indefinite prior restraint of films that had not been judged ob-
scene. 201 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that
ordinary nuisances might be restrained in such a manner, but the regula-
tion of communicative activity such as the exhibition of a motion picture
must adhere to more narrowly drawn procedures. 20 2 The Court noted that
the burden of sustaining an injunction against a future exhibition is even
heavier than the burden of justifying a criminal sanction for a past com-
munication. 20 3 Then, recalling its prior decisions that had held that any
system of prior restraint must bear a heavy presumption against its consti-
tutional validity,2°4 the Court found that article 4667(a) had not overcome
the presumption.20 5 Accordingly, criminal statutes imposing penalties af-
ter the fact remain the state's principal tools in regulating obscenity.
What effect the 1979 statutes have had on law enforcement is beyond the
scope of this Comment. In Dallas police activity has increased statistically,
but vice division officers state that they are not consciously doing anything
differently. 20 6 Other researchers may want to study the number of arrests
statewide, the number of convictions, and the severity of the penalties im-
posed.207
Beyond the question of whether the new law has made a difference in
law enforcement is the question of whether it should even exist. The Presi-
Oent's Commission on Obscenity concluded that explicit sexual material
does not cause sex crimes.208 Zoning ordinances can control the exterior
201. See 100 S. Ct. at 1161-62, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 421.
202. Id at 1160-61, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 420.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1161 n.13, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 420 n.13.
205. Id at 1162, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 421.
206. In 1978 Dallas Vice Squad officers instituted 113 obscenity cases. In 1979 the total
rose to 146. In the first seven months of 1980 the police department has made 167 cases.
Interview with Sgt. R.E. Riley, Dallas Police Vice Division, in Dallas, Tex. (Aug. 15, 1980).
The one area in which the new law clearly has made a difference is regulation of obscene
devices. Previously, no state law prohibited their distribution. Thus, whatever the number
of prosecutions for promotion of obscene devices, it represents an increase.
207. The Chairman of the House Select Committee on Child Pornography is pessimistic
about the effect of section 43.25. State Representative Ralph Wallace believes that the use of
children in Texas to create pornography has gotten much worse. Wallace maintains that the
judicial system discourages the reporting of offenses because of vigorous cross-examination
of victims, many of whom decide they never should have reported the crime. To that extent
the problems of child pornography victims resemble the problems of rape victims. The safe-
guards of the legal system, however, are unlikely to be changed. Child pornography prose-
cutions also are complicated by the transience of the victims. Many of them are runaways,
Wallace says, or people who will not testify under any circumstances. Telephone interview
with Texas Representative Ralph Wallace (July 1980). While it may not be a panacea, the
new law does go a long way toward discouraging such abuse of children. Any future proce-
dural changes should be scrutinized carefully so that they do not adversely affect other im-
portant rights, such as courtroom confrontation by the accused.
208. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 32 (1970);
Project, An Empirical Inquiry Into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscen-
ity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 810 (1977) (national survey indicating that since Miller the quantity




appearance of buildings, 20 9 shielding members of the public from un-
wanted viewing of offensive material. The laws in Texas and other states,
however, seek to prevent even those who want obscene materials from
having them. A system of law that criminalizes the distribution of obscen-
ity but protects the private possession of such material is at best inconsis-
tent and at worst hypocritical. 210 Until the contradiction is resolved,
regulation of sexual material will remain an intractable problem.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1979 the Texas Legislature revised the Texas obscenity laws to reflect
the standards required for obscenity regulation as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller v. California. The dissonance between the
Miller approach and Texas law as it existed before the new enactments
had created a climate of confusion for prosecutors and defendants. Under
the new law, examples of obscenity are specified so as to put potential
offenders on notice as to what is prohibited. Juries, however, serve as the
ultimate arbiters of obscenity, and they make their determinations by ap-
plying contemporary community standards. This system is likely to lead
to wide variances in decisions and thus to more confusion. As a result, the
obscenity legislation likely will suffer from the same problem that has
plagued such efforts since governments first set out to regulate obscene
material: the definitional problem.
No one can define obscenity satisfactorily. Standards change in time,
space, and depth. Texas's 1979 law is merely another attempt to codify the
uncodifiable. If history repeats itself, the Supreme Court will change its
standards in a few years; Texas will follow suit and change its laws again,
and the "intractable obscenity problem" will remain unresolved. Because
public sentiment appears to favor some type of control over none, the ob-
vious solution to the dilemma, abandoning attempts to regulate, is a re-
mote possibility. The new Texas law is neither fair nor equitable.
Definitions of obscenity may have been changed, but the resulting statutes
are no less confusing than their predecessors.
209. See Note, Using Constitutional Zoning to Neutralize Adult Entertainment-Detroit o
New York, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455 (1977); 22 N.Y.L. Sor. L. REV. 753 (1977). See also
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning regulation is a valid
exercise of state's police power).
210. The Court, in United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft.
Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); and United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Pho-
tographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), indicated that the right to private possession of obscene mate-
rial did not include the right to buy or sell it.
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